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MEMBER:
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

CHAIRMAN:
COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C.

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APPNS. CMTE.

*ask Bob to prepare
a note to Joe, w/ planning what needs to be
w/ planning etc -*

Honorable George H. Mahon, Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

My dear Mr. Chairman:

Sometime ago you suggested that I not criticize the Central Intelligence Agency, and in deference to you I am not placing the enclosed column from the Nashville Banner of February 19 last in the Record.

However, I think this column is worthy of thoughtful and careful consideration.

With very best wishes, I am

Sincerely your friend,

Joe
JOE L. EVINS, M. C.

JLE:brm

NASHVILLE BANNER
February 19, 1968

U.S. Intelligence Agency Needs To Be Overhauled

NEW YORK—North Korea's hijacking of our intelligence ship Pueblo, like the Israeli bombing of our similar ship, the Liberty, during the Egyptian



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war, raised the question as to why, with all we do in the intelligence field, we're so constantly the victim of surprise, surprise, surprise.

The function of intelligence is to keep us from being surprised. Incredibly, Washington is spending at least \$4 billion a year for intelligence. What's wrong?

Castro surprised Washington at the Bay of Pigs, the Soviet's Cuban missile installations were a surprise, the Berlin Wall was, a Red attack on the Dominican Republic and the Zanzibar take-over were surprises, and the whole Vietnam war has been one endless surprise after another. Why?

On November 29, 1965, while we were being told that all was well, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara stated: "I must say I was surprised by the intensity and scale of these Viet Cong attacks." Now, more than two years later, Washington is admittedly still surprised by the same unexpected intensity and capability in the attacks on Saigon and 20 additional cities.

The Central Intelligence Agency's current budget (secret) is certainly around \$1½ billion a year, according to the official findings of the House Armed Services Committee. The CIA alone is larger than the State Department and spends more than twice as much money. Its Langley, Va., headquarters cost \$46 million. About 10,000 people work there in intelligence. At least another 5,000 are scattered throughout the world, burrowing everywhere for intelligence. And this should make the taxpayers wonder what's happened to the CIA's official contention.

CIA DEPUTY DIRECTOR L. K. White testified to the House Appropriations Committee in 1956 that its \$46 million building headquarters would "put things under one roof" and save \$600,000 a year. Well, now still another CIA building ("No. 213") has arisen behind the scenes at the Naval Gun Factory in southeast Washington at the cost of another \$30 million. And surprise, surprise, the CIA now has branch offices in Denver, Detroit, Houston, Miami, Minneapolis, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, San Francisco, Seattle, etc., although the CIA is supposed to concern itself with foreign intelligence whereas the U.S.A. is the domain of the FBI. The only blessing is that CIA Director Richard Helms is a very able man, but, as Tiny Tim said, "There's never been such a squash."

In addition, the competing agencies are too many and enormous for me to expect you to believe the facts. Actually, there were recently in Berlin alone at least 40 known U.S. intelligence agencies and their branches — competing.

The CIA was founded to eliminate the dangerous compartmentalization and duplication. But the Pueblo, for example, wasn't operated by the CIA entirely. It was controlled by the hush-hush National Security Agency, a separate, immense group that grows and grows inside still another gigantic building in Washington's suburbs.

THIS IS A SPRAWLING, secret adjunct of the U.S. Army and Navy and both the NSA and CIA spend much time wondering what each other is doing. Beyond this Mr. McNamara somehow built an additional large intelligence structure within his own office that reported only to him and competed behind the scenes in Vietnam and elsewhere with the NSA and CIA alike. This, of course, is one of the first things incoming Defense Secretary Clark Clifford should abandon.

We simply cannot afford, nor should we put up with the surprises, surprises, surprises that result. It is absolutely imperative to condense the fog in Washington's cockoo-land intelligence cloud into an efficient raft. The overlapping and mutually jealous agencies are loaded with empire builders. In the field where the country's unsung heroes daily risk their lives in espionage they are terribly snafued by the tremendous bureaucracy here at home. And many whom I know well are likewise disgusted by the special McNamara agents who materialize majestically like Sherlock Holmes' "Baker Street Irregulars" whenever odd chores beckon and Mr. McNamara thought there was a job to be done.

The hour is late and the danger great. Washington cannot endlessly postpone the streamlining and retooling of the sick intelligence